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Comment
The End of Sham Issue Advocacy:
The Case to Uphold Electioneering
Communications in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002
Andrew Pratt*
The 2002 election year marked the end of political
campaigns as we know them. Candidates for federal office
must now contend with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA),1 which transforms how future elections will run.
The BCRA imposes disclosure requirements on campaign-
related communications 2 and prohibits the use of "soft money"
by political parties.3 President George W. Bush signed the
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000,
University of Denver. The author would like to thank Professor David
Schultz, Jeff Harrington, Jayna Mathieu, and the members of the Minnesota
Law Review for their helpful insights. The author would especially like to
thank Erin Fresvik, soon to become Erin Pratt, for her unlimited kindness and
support.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81. The bill is
commonly known as "McCain-Feingold," after its main Senate co-sponsors,
Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WI). The main House
of Representatives co-sponsors were Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin
Meehan (D-MA).
2. Id. §§ 201-204. For a further discussion of this issue, also known as
"electioneering communications," see infra notes 15-22 and accompanying
text.
3. BCRA § 101, 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 82-86. "Soft money" is
commonly defined as money raised outside the contribution limits set forth in
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1971). Under the
FECA, a person may donate $1,000 per federal candidate, per election. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam). These donations are
generally known as "hard money." Once these limits are met, persons still
wishing to donate may give unlimited amounts of soft money to the
candidate's political party, "with the understanding that the contribution to
the party will produce increased party spending for the candidate's benefit."
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 447 (2001).
The BCRA also contains many miscellaneous provisions, none of which
will be covered in this Comment. Among other things, the BCRA prohibits
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BCRA into law on March 27, 2002,4 and its constitutionality
was immediately challenged on First Amendment grounds by a
host of plaintiffs, chiefly Senator Mitch McConnell. 5
The BCRA's controversial nature spotlights the inherent
tension between regulation of political campaigns and free
speech. On one hand, with soft money donations (and
corporate scandals) at an all-time high,6 the general public may
be eager to put the brakes on runaway campaign spending.7
On the other hand, any restrictions on campaign financing may
also violate the First Amendment. 8 A three-judge panel in a
federal district court is currently weighing each side of the
issue,9 and the losing party will almost certainly appeal directly
to the Supreme Court.10
The Supreme Court has a number of campaign finance
candidates from fundraising on federal property, strengthens the ban on
donations from foreign nationals, and regulates donations to presidential
inauguration committees. See BCRA §§ 302, 303, 308, 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116
Stat.) at 96, 103.
4. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Signs
Campaign Finance Reform Act (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.law.stanford.edu
library/campaignfinance/signing.statement.327.html.
5. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C.
May 7, 2002), http://lawschool.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance/mcconnell
-v-feccomplaint50702.pdf. Senator McConnell is a Republican from Kentucky.
6. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Free Speech and Campaign Reform Don't
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A21 ("After Enron and the Lincoln
Bedroom, does anyone doubt that enormous political contributions provide
donors with disproportionate access to elected federal officials?"); Common
Cause, Soft Money Laundromat Donor Profiles, at http://www.commoncause.or
g/laundromat/stat/topdonorsOl.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) (listing total soft
money donations during the 2001-2002 election cycle to Republicans at $161.4
million and to Democrats at $120.8 million).
7. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, CITIZEN MCCAIN 2 (2002) (noting that
over six million people voted for campaign finance reformer McCain in the
2000 Republican presidential primary election).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
9. See The Campaign & Media Legal Ctr., McConnell v. FEC: Status
Update, at http://www.camlc.org (Nov. 7, 2002).
10. The BCRA provides for expedited review. A challenge is first filed
with a three-judge court in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, with an appeal to be directly heard by the United States Supreme
Court. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81,
113-14.
1664
2003] THE END OF SHAM ISSUE ADVOCACY 1665
precedents to guide its path.11 The seminal case on this issue is
Buckley v. Valeo.12 These cases suggest that the Court is
hospitable to campaign finance reform, especially in the area of
disclosure requirements for "electioneering communications."1 3
Although the BCRA also prohibits the use of soft money by
political parties, this Comment focuses solely on the
constitutionality of the Act's electioneering communication
disclosure provisions. 14
This Comment argues that the BCRA's electioneering
disclosure regulations are constitutional. Part I delineates the
BCRA's electioneering provisions. Part II evaluates the
Supreme Court's standard in Buckley v. Valeo and its evolution
in subsequent cases. Part III argues that the BCRA's
electioneering provisions are constitutional under the Buckley
framework. Finally, Part IV analyzes Senator McConnell's
complaint and determines that it must fail because the BCRA
is narrowly tailored to fulfill compelling governmental
interests.
11. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49
(1995) (holding that Ohio's campaign disclosure regulations do not apply to an
individual pamphleteer); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 669-70 (1990) (holding that a nonprofit business-oriented corporation
must comply with Michigan's campaign disclosure regulations); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) (holding that
campaign disclosure regulations do not apply to a nonprofit, political-oriented
corporation).
12. 424 U.S. 1, 35, 84 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that Congress may
constitutionally regulate certain forms of political speech, such as campaign
contributions and disclosure of communications).
13. The BCRA defines electioneering communications as campaign-
related advertisements aired in close proximity to a primary or general
election. See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
14. For discussions on soft money limitations, see generally Robert F.
Bauer, Going Nowhere, Slowly: The Long Struggle over Campaign Finance
Reform and Some Attempts at Explanation and Alternatives, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 741 (2002); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First
Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994); Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commisson, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 91 (1997); Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign
Finance, and "The Thing that Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST COMMENT. 483
(2000); Lisa P. Howle, Campaign Finance Reform: Meaningful Reform
Impinges on Unfettered Political Speech, Violating the First Amendment, 75 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 143 (1997); Stephanie P. Manson, When Money Talks:
Reconciling Buckley, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Reform, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1109 (2001).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002
Section 201 of the BCRA introduces the phrase
"electioneering communication" into the campaign finance
lexicon. 15 These communications are defined as any broadcast,
cable, or satellite advertisement that refers to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office and is targeted to the
relevant electorate 16 within sixty days before a general election
or thirty days before a primary election.' 7 Once an expenditure
is defined as an electioneering communication, the BCRA
regulations attach.' 8 An entity funding communications that
cost $10,000 or more and are targeted to the relevant electorate
must disclose its identity, its principal place of business, and
the elections to which the electioneering communications
pertain. 19 These disclosures must be made to the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) within twenty-four hours of the
expenditure. 20
During the run-up to an election, the electioneering
communication definition attempts to eliminate the
controversial distinction between advocacy of a candidate and
advocacy of an issue.21 In essence, the BCRA holds that an
advertisement that contains a reference to a clearly identified
candidate within sixty days of a general election or thirty days
of a primary election is express advocacy of a candidate and
15. BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3), 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 89.
16. An electioneering communication is targeted to the relevant electorate
if it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a congressional district or
the state in which a candidate for senator seeks to represent. See id. sec.
201(a), § 304(f)(3)(C).
17. Id. sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A)(i)(II). The Federal Election Commission
recently promulgated a rule that defined an electioneering communication
during a primary election for presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
An advertisement is an electioneering communication if it can be received by
50,000 or more people in a state that holds a presidential primary within
thirty days, or if it can be received by 50,000 or more people anywhere in the
country within thirty days of the beginning of a national party nominating
convention. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,189, 65,211
(Oct. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
18. See BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f), 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 88-90.
19. Id. sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(2)(A)-(F).
20. Id. sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(1). The FEC recently promulgated rules
exempting communications by state and local candidates and communications
by nonprofit corporations organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) from the
BCRA's disclosure requirements. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 65,199.
21. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (explaining the
difference between express advocacy and issue advocacy).
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may be regulated. 22 The BCRA's electioneering provisions will
probably be upheld by the Supreme Court only if it follows its
campaign finance precedents, such as Buckley v. Valeo.23
II. BUCKLEY YOUR SEAT BELTS: THE SUPREME COURT
GOES DOWN THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE ROAD
A. BUCKLEY V. VALEO CHANGES THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Buckley v. Valeo has stood as the Court's definitive
campaign finance precedent for over twenty-five years,
although the per curiam opinion was hurriedly drafted in time
for the 1976 elections. 24  The case arose when various
candidates for federal office, political parties, and other
organizations challenged the validity of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA).25 In one portion of the ruling, the Court
examined the FECA's disclosure requirements 26 on campaign
expenditures, such as electioneering communications relative
to a "clearly identified candidate."27  Because disclosure
requirements infringed upon a campaign speaker's unfettered
First Amendment right to speak, the Court held these
regulations to "exacting scrutiny."28 The Court used this high
standard to protect the dictates of the First Amendment, as
"significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the
sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a
22. If the electioneering communication definition is found to be too vague
or broad by a court, the BCRA provides an alternative definition that
mandates disclosure of communications which promote, support, attack, or
oppose a candidate "and which also [are] suggestive of no plausible meaning
other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." BCRA,
sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A)(ii), 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 89.
23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
24. See Hasen, supra note 14, at 483.
25. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
26. The FECA mandated that any person who contributed or expended
more than $100 in a year must file a disclosure statement with the FEC. See
id. at 74-75. The Court held in another part of the opinion that the FECA's
limitations on campaign contributions were not unconstitutional on their face,
while limitations on campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 35, 51.
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id. at 64. This test was first promulgated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that Alabama's request to compel the state
NAACP chapter to reveal the names and addresses of its members would
cause its members to withdraw from the Association out of fear, thus violating
the members' First Amendment right to associate).
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mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest."29 The
FECA's disclosure requirements also produced problems of
vagueness and overbreadth; 30 these concerns are also asserted
today by the BCRA's critics and must be overcome for the Act
to survive constitutional attack.31  In short, the FECA
regulations in Buckley had to be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling governmental interest.32
The government's justification for the 'disclosure
regulations was threefold. First, disclosure requirements serve
informational purposes by allowing voters to evaluate "each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often
possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign
speeches."33 Second, if all contributions and expenditures were
disclosed to the public, corruption would be deterred, especially
in the form of quid pro quos between candidates and interest
groups. 34  Third, disclosure requirements are an essential
means of detecting other campaign contribution violations. 35
The Court concluded that "disclosure requirements-certainly
in most applications-appear to be the least restrictive means
of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption." 36
In this application, however, the Court noted that the
disclosure requirements appeared unconstitutionally vague. 37
The disclosure requirements were thus modified to apply only
when campaign expenditures contained words of express
advocacy. 38  In other words, no reporting or disclosure
29. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
30. Id. at 76-84.
31. See infra notes 135-67 and accompanying text (discussing how the
BCRA's electioneering provisions do not suffer from problems of vagueness
and overbreadth).
32. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id. The Court of Appeals discussed possible quid pro quos from
campaign contributions, which included a pledge by the dairy industry to
contribute $2 million, broken into small amounts, to President Richard
Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839
n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Possibly as a result of the contributions, in March 1971
Nixon overruled his Secretary of Agriculture and ordered price supports for
the dairy industry. See id.
35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id. at 42 (stating that the FECA's "clearly identified candidate"
language could broadly encompass discussions of political issues as well as
advocacy of particular candidates).
38. See id. at 44.
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requirements would apply to an individual (or a union or a
corporation) who did not expressly advocate for or against a
candidate while making a campaign expenditure. 39
In a frequently cited footnote, the Court defined the term
"express advocacy." 40 If a communication uses words "such as
'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for
Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject,"' it expressly refers to
a candidate.41  All advertisements not using these "magic
words" generally are unregulated "issue advocacy"
communications. 42 Issue advocacy advertisements are thus an
unregulated loophole for campaign-related speech because they
are not subject to disclosure under the FECA.43 Issue advocacy
proponents cite the First Amendment as justification for the
lack of regulation on the communications. 44 At any rate, the
Buckley Court's conclusion is relatively clear: A communication
39. See id. at 80.
40. Id. at 44 n.52.
41. Id. This footnote was embedded in the Court's discussion of the
FECA's $1,000 limitation on campaign expenditures relative to a clearly
identified candidate. Later in the opinion, in its discussion on the FECA's
disclosure requirements, which is more relevant to this Comment, the Court
referred back to this footnote to define express advocacy. Id. at 80 n.108.
42. For a basic discussion on issue advocacy advertisements, see generally
Christopher J. Ayers, Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for Campaign
Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1788 (2001); Richard Briffault, Issue
Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999);
Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham
Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773 (2001) [hereinafter Hasen, Measuring];
Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 265 (2000) [hereinafter Hasen, Surprisingly]; Kirk L. Jowers, Issue
Advocacy: If It Cannot Be Regulated When It Is Least Valuable, It Cannot Be
Regulated when It Is Most Valuable, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 65 (2000); Scott E.
Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay Under the "Magic
Words" Doctrine?, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 33 (1998).
43. See Hasen, Measuring, supra note 42, at 1776-77. Professor Hasen
notes that issue advocacy communications are outside the ambit of the FECA's
regulations "because the advertisement ends with something like, 'Call Smith
and tell her what you think of her Medicare plan' rather than 'Defeat Smith.'"
Id. at 1777. For a few examples of how this advertising method works, see
infra text accompanying notes 88-96.
44. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Fatal Flaws in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, MONEY & POL. REP. (BNA), Apr. 22,
2002, at 1, 2, http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/debate/Bopp.pdf ("The
[BCRA] unabashedly seeks to eliminate issue advocacy by pulling down the
twin pillars of free expression and association."); Jowers, supra note 42, at 65
("Unfortunately, campaign finance reformers, and at times the Federal
Election Commission... remain undeterred by the First Amendment.").
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using the magic words, or their equivalent, is subject to the
FECA's disclosure requirements, but all other communications
are unregulated issue communications. 45
B. BUCKLEY UNDERGOES A METAMORPHOSIS: HOW ITS
CAMPAIGN FINANCE STANDARD EVOLVED OVER TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS
1. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life
Ten years after Buckley, the Court in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL)
extended its definition of express advocacy past the magic
words test.46 MCFL was a small nonprofit corporation that
advocated a pro-life viewpoint.47 Prior to the state's 1978
primary election, MCFL prepared a voter's guide that identified
pro-life candidates.48 On the back page of the guide, "VOTE
PRO-LIFE" was printed in large letters, and the flyer listed the
candidates for every office in every district in Massachusetts. 49
The flyer identified each candidate as either supporting or
opposing pro-life principles, and it included thirteen
photographs of candidates that received MCFL's highest pro-
life rating.50 The Court held that the MCFL voter's guide
expressly advocated for specific candidates.51 The guide did not
discuss mere political issues, but instead provided "an explicit
directive: vote for these (named) candidates."52 In other words,
the guide used words of express advocacy even though none of
the words in Buckley's magic words test were written on the
flyer.53 This ruling applied the express advocacy definition
with enough flexibility to include some language other than the
45. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
46. See 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).
47. See id. at 241.
48. See id. at 243.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 243-44.
51. See id. at 249.
52. Id. This is the first and only time the Court has discussed the
meaning of express advocacy since Buckley. See Briffault, supra note 42, at
1755.
53. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249. The Court notes this fact when it said
"[tihe fact that this message is marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith'
does not change its essential nature." Id.
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magic words listed in Buckley.54  As one scholar noted,
"Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., thus, modestly broadened
Buckley's definition of what constitutes express advocacy.
55
Because MCFL used words of express advocacy, it would
presumably have had to disclose its identity and sources of
funding under the FECA. The Court, however, sympathized
with MCFL. As an incorporated entity, MCFL already had to
deal with stringent disclosure requirements for its campaign
spending.56 Forcing another disclosure requirement on MCFL
would "create a disincentive for the organization itself to
speak."57 In response to the government's concern with the
appearance of corruption resulting from the campaign
expenditure, the Court determined that MCFL was only a
political corporation, not a typical for-profit entity, so it could
have no corruptive influence. 58  In other words, MCFL's
communications could not be corruptive because it "was formed
to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital."59 Although
the Court found the FECA provisions inapplicable to MCFL,
the opinion is noteworthy because it broadened the meaning of
express advocacy past the rigid magic words test.60 Four years
later, the Court upheld the imposition of campaign disclosure
requirements on business corporations. 61
2. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
Since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, Congress has
restricted corporations and unions from contributing directly to
54. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam).
55. Briffault, supra note 42, at 1756.
56. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254.
57. Id. at 254 n.7.
58. Id. at 259.
59. Id. In a later case, the Court found that a nonprofit business
corporation could have a corruptive influence through its communications.
See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 662 (1990);
infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. The BCRA essentially
codified MCFL's holding when it exempted small nonprofit organizations from
its electioneering communication disclosure requirements. See BCRA, Pub. L.
No. 107-155, sec. 203(b), § 316(c)(2), 2002 U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 91.
Furthermore, the FEC exempted additional nonprofit corporations organized
under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) from the electioneering communication definition.
See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,189, 65,211 (Oct. 23,
2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
61. See Austin. 494 U.S. at 662.
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campaigns. 62  The Court upheld state campaign finance
restrictions on a nonprofit corporation's political activities in
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.63 In 1985,
Michigan had a special election to fill a vacancy in its state
House of Representatives. 64 The Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce attempted to place a newspaper advertisement
supporting a certain candidate, but it proposed to pay for the
ad out of its general treasury, which violated Michigan
campaign finance laws. 65 In upholding the restrictions, the
Austin Court found that there was a compelling state interest
because "the unique legal and economic characteristics of
corporations necessitate some regulation of their political
expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of
corruption."66  The Court was concerned that these
advantageous corporate characteristics would result in
immense campaign contributions, which would in turn corrupt
the political process.67 The state interest was narrowly tailored
because the Michigan statute still allowed corporations to make
campaign expenditures, with the caveat that the spending
must come out of a segregated fund, like a political action
committee.68 The Austin Court explained that MCFL, which
invalidated disclosure regulations on political nonprofit
corporations,69 was distinguished because the Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce was primarily engaged in business
activities.70 Thus, Austin may be understood as validating
general campaign finance regulations on corporations, 71 but the
Court did not comment on whether the Chamber of Commerce's
advertisement was express advocacy. Because the proposed ad
62. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 208-09 (1982).
63. 494 U.S. 652, 662 (1990).
64. See id. at 656.
65. See id. The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce never ran the
advertisement, but instead sought injunctive relief from enforcement of the
state disclosure regulations, alleging they were unconstitutional. See id.
66. Id. at 658-59. Characteristics that are unique to corporations are
traits like limited liability and perpetual life. See id.; see also Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) ("The
availability of [the corporate treasury] may make a corporation a formidable
political presence . . ").
67. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
68. See id.
69. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259-63.
70. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 662.
71. See id. at 672 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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stated "Elect Richard Bandstra," however, it constituted
express advocacy under Buckley's magic words test.72 It took
five more years before the Court applied its fledgling campaign
finance principles outside of the corporate context.
3. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission73 involved the
Court striking down a state law that imposed a fine on anyone
who distributed anonymous campaign literature. 74 After first
noting that the author's right to remain anonymous "is an
aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment," 75 the Court rejected Ohio's purported campaign
disclosure interests in preventing fraudulent statements and
providing voters with additional information. 76 Therefore, the
Court invalidated the state's fine on anonymous
pamphleteers. 77
McIntyre should not be read as proscribing all state efforts
to require disclosure of campaign materials, however. The
Court went out of its way to mention that the decision did not
apply to communications in candidate elections. 78 The opinion
also provided a solid basis for preserving disclosure
requirements on corporations by stating that "' [c] orporate
1 72. Id. at 714 app. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (listing "elect" as one of its magic words).
73. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
74. Mrs. Margaret McIntyre handed out anonymous leaflets that opposed
a school tax levy. See id. at 337. Although she was fined only $100 under
state law, and despite her death during the litigation, her estate pursued her
claim on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 340.
75. Id. at 342.
76. Id. at 348-53. Ohio's interest in providing voters with additional
election-related information was insufficient, because "in the case of a handbill
written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and
address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate
the document's message." Id. at 348-49.
77. Id. at 357.
78. The Court noted that
[i]n candidate elections, the Government can identify a compelling
state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from
campaign expenditures. Disclosure of expenditures lessens the risk
that individuals will spend money to support a candidate as a quid
pro quo for special treatment after the candidate is in office. Curriers
of favor will be deterred by the knowledge that all expenditures will
be scrutinized by the Federal Election Commission and by the public
for just this sort of abuse.
Id. at 356 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976) (per curiam)).
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advertising, unlike some methods of participation in political
campaigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the
source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure,
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to
which they are being subjected.' 79
The line of cases following Buckley fails to fully address
how to require disclosure on campaign-related material,
although it does provide justification for state disclosure
requirements on corporations and individuals. 80 These cases
also do little to elaborate on the Court's definition of express
advocacy, with MCFL being the only case to reach the issue.81
Most of the federal appellate courts, some with a little
reluctance, have followed lockstep with Buckley's magic words
test narrowly interpreting express advocacy. 82 The BCRA is an
example of Congress attempting to fix Buckley's test by finding
a solution to the dilemma of "sham issue advocacy." 83
79. Id. at 354 n.18 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S.
765, 792 n.32 (1978)). This statement supports the Austin Court's decision to
allow campaign regulations on corporations. See supra text accompanying
note 71.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 63-79 (discussing the Court's
holdings in Austin and McIntyre).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
82. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 190, 198-99
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that certain television advertisements which clearly
and exclusively refer to candidates are issue-oriented, although the court
admitted the result "may be counterintuitive to a commonsense understanding
of the message conveyed by the television political advertisements at issue");
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236
F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[C]ommunications that do not contain
express words advocating the election or defeat of a particular candidate are
deemed issue advocacy, which the First Amendment shields from
regulation."); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc., v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970
(8th Cir. 1999) (noting the governmental concern that groups will simply avoid
the "magic words" test to couch their advertisements in issue advocacy, but
found that Buckley's bright-line test controls); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1057 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing
that the FEC's contention that it knows express advocacy when it sees it is
impermissibly vague); Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that it is impossible to tell when issue advocacy bleeds
into express advocacy, so Buckley's bright-line test is needed).
83. "Sham issue advocacy" describes an advertisement that has the
unmistakable intent of express advocacy but simply avoids the magic words
test. See Hasen, Measuring, supra note 42, at 1776. The ad is thus considered
to be issue advocacy, not because it focuses on an issue, but because it avoids
the magic words of express advocacy. See id.
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C. THE PROBLEM OF SHAM ISSUE ADVOCACY
Through its magic words test, the Buckley Court laid down
a bright-line rule to distinguish express advocacy from issue
advocacy.8 4 Financiers of express advocacy communications
had to disclose their identities, but the groups behind issue
advocacy advertisements could remain anonymous.85 Special
interest groups thus began to produce ads focusing on
candidates without using the magic words of express
advocacy.8 6 These sham issue ads are not regulated by the
FECA, and they have proliferated with astonishing ease:
It is child's play for political advertisers and campaign professionals
to develop ads that effectively advocate or oppose the cause of a
candidate but stop short of the formal express advocacy that the
courts permit to be regulated. The most common tactic for political
advertisers is to include some language calling for the reader, viewer,
or listener to respond to the message by doing something other than
voting.
87
One scholar recently spotlighted the problems posed by
sham issue advocacy advertisements by focusing on the
following communication aired during Montana's 1996
congressional campaign:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but he took a
swing at his wife. Yellowtail's explanation? He "only slapped her,"
but her nose was broken. He talks law and order, but is himself a
convicted criminal. And though he talks about protecting children,
Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments, then voted
against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail and tell him
we don't approve of his wrongful behavior. Call (406) 443-3620.88
This advertisement was paid for by the "Citizens for
Reform," which spent $2 million nationwide distributing
similar issue advertisements on the eve of the election. 89 The
ad does not focus on issues; it puts the emphasis on Yellowtail
and his lack of character. Under the Buckley magic words
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam).
85. See id. at 80 ("[The FECA] does not reach all partisan discussion for it
only requires disclosure of those expenditures that expressly advocate a
particular election result.").
86. One commentator put the magic words dilemma in a commercial
context: "This is akin to claiming that an ad using the phrase 'Join the Pepsi
generation' does not promote Pepsi because it does not use the word 'buy.'"
Trevor Potter, New Law Follows Supreme Court Rulings, MONEY & POL. REP.
(BNA), Apr. 22, 2002, at 1, 7, http://www.brook.edu/dbydocroot/gs/cf/
debate/Potter.pdf.
87. Briffault, supra note 42, at 1759.
88. Id. at 1751.
89. See id. at 1751-52. 1752 n.3.
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test, 90  however, the ad avoided expressly advocating
Yellowtail's defeat or his opponent's election. 91  Therefore,
under Buckley's rubric, it was an advertisement about issues
and exempt from disclosure requirements under the FECA.92
Consider another example. In 1996, the Republican
National Committee produced an advertisement on behalf of
presidential candidate Bob Dole. 93 The ad's transcript read as
follows:
Mr. Dole. We have a moral obligation to give our children an America
with the opportunity and values of the nation we grew up in.
Voice Over. Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From his parents
he learned the value of hard work, honesty and responsibility. So
when his country called, he answered. He was seriously wounded in
combat. Paralyzed, he underwent nine operations.
Mr. Dole. I went around looking for a miracle that would make me
whole again.
Voice Over. The doctors said he'd never walk again. But after 39
months, he proved them wrong.
A Man Named Ed. He persevered, he never gave up. He fought his
way back from total paralysis.
Voice Over. Like many Americans, his life experience and values
serve as a strong moral compass. The principle of work to replace
welfare. The principle of accountability to strengthen our criminal
justice system. The principle of discipline to end wasteful
Washington spending.
Mr. Dole. It all comes down to values. What you believe in. What you
sacrifice for. And what you stand for.94
The Dole advertisement did not use any of Buckley's magic
words or their functional equivalents, so it was not considered
to be an express advocacy ad.95 While the ad did briefly
mention the issues of welfare, criminal justice, and wasteful
spending, the ad was primarily about Bob Dole.96
Sham issue advertising presents a problem, as the ads are
very prevalent in today's campaigns. According to a study by
the Brennan Center for Justice, in 1998 political parties and
90. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
91. See Briffault, supra note 42, at 1751. Yellowtail's opponent was
Republican Rick Hill. See id.
92. See id. at 1752.
93. See 148 CONG. REC. S2115 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Levin).
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. In other words, "[any reasonable person who hears that ad knows it is
an ad supporting the candidacy of Bob Dole." Id.
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groups spent an estimated $30 million on issue ads. 97 Just two
years later, an estimated $200 million was spent on such ads. 98
The problem inherent in such proliferation is "[v]iewers see
more and more ads, [and] as long as the ads avoid using magic
words, the electorate gets less and less information about who
is behind them."99 Disclosure requirements on sham issue
advocacy communications, on the other hand, expose campaign
financiers to the public, which fulfills the public's interest in a
better informed electorate.100
It is also noteworthy how many advertisements go out of
their way to avoid using words of express advocacy. In 2000,
for example, only 2% of ads run by political parties and other
groups used Buckley's magic words. 1 1 A popular way to avoid
disclosure regulations is to end an advertisement that criticizes
a candidate by urging audience members to "call" the candidate
or the relevant political group to express their views. 10 2 Since
such an ad merely tells its viewers to "call" a candidate, it is
not expressly advocating for or against the candidate's
opponent, even though the viewer may come away with that
impression. 10 3 Again, once a communication is classified as
issue advocacy, it escapes all disclosure requirements imposed
by the FECA.10 4 To fix this problem, Congress passed the
BCRA, which regulates sham issue advocacy advertisements. 105
97. See Craig B. Holman & Luke McLoughlin, Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
Buying Time: The Fallacies of Campaign Reform and our Advertising Laws, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/oped_2002_0402.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2003).
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
101. See Holman & McLoughlin, supra note 97 ("Most tellingly, 90 percent
of candidate ads-which are by definition considered express advocacy
whether they use magic words or not--did not employ magic words. The fact
that so few candidate ads incorporate magic words highlights how
unnecessary explicit words are to convey an explicit electioneering message.").
102. See Briffault, supra note 42, at 1759-63. A study of issue ads in 1997-
98 found that almost 80% exhort a viewer to make a phone call. See id.
(citation omitted).
103. See id.
104. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (defining the term
"electioneering communication").
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III. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT'S
ELECTIONEERING PROVISIONS ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BUCKLEY AND
OTHER SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The BCRA's disclosure requirements apply to all
advertisements that refer to a clearly identified federal
candidate, are targeted to the relevant electorate, and appear
within sixty days before a general election or thirty days before
a primary election. 10 6 This legislation is justifiable because
Buckley's magic words test for express advocacy disclosure
requirements is ineffective.107
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court has ruled twice
on the subject of express advocacy. 10 8 While Buckley defined
express advocacy pursuant to the magic words test, 10 9 MCFL
expanded the definition to include communications that do not
recite Buckley's magic words test verbatim. 110 This section
demonstrates that the BCRA's electioneering provisions are
constitutional under Buckley's "exacting scrutiny" standard"'
because they reflect compelling governmental interests in fully
informing the electorate, preventing corruption, or the
106. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A)(i), 2002
U.S.S.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 89.
107. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 86, at 10 ("Because the court's [sic] 'magic
words' test has proven eminently avoidable as it has been exploited these past
ten years, it has opened an enormous loophole in the nearly century-old
prohibition against corporate and union spending in federal elections.");
Thomas & Bowman, supra note 42, at 35 ("A test requiring the magic words
'elect,' 'support,' etc., or their nearly perfect synonyms for a finding of express
advocacy would preserve the First Amendment right of unfettered expression
only at the expense of eviscerating the [FECA]." (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987))); Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
Policy Comm. on Political Adver., Five New Ideas to Deal With the Problems
Posed by Campaign Appeals Masquerading as Issue Advocacy, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/cmag-temp/cmag-recs.html (last
visited March 22, 2003) ("Participants in the political arena, by simply
eschewing the use of the magic words of express advocacy, have been able to
turn the world of campaign finance upside down...."); Holman &
McLoughlin, supra note 97 ("The magic-words test appears to have been
eclipsed by modern advertising techniques, though it remains in many corners
the prevailing standard for express advocacy.").
108. See supra notes 24-60 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley and
MCFL).
109. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam).
110. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 249-50 (1986).
111. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see also supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
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appearance of corruption, and detecting other campaign finance
violations.112 Although the Act has a few weaknesses, 113 it does
not suffer from the fatal wounds of vagueness or overbreadth,
and it follows Supreme Court precedent. 14
A. THE BCRA's ELECTIONEERING PROVISIONS REFLECT
COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
In Buckley, the government offered three interests to
justify the FECA's disclosure requirements: The provisions
provide information to the voters; they deter the appearance of
corruption between candidates and campaign contributors; and
they gather necessary data to detect other campaign
violations. 1 5 These interests are essentially replicated in the
BCRA. 116  The Buckley Court accepted that the First
Amendment may be curtailed pursuant to a balancing test in
certain situations, as "there are governmental interests
sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of
infringement, particularly when the 'free functioning of our
national institutions' is involved."'17 Therefore, if the BCRA's
disclosure provisions are narrowly tailored, with little chance of
invalidating true issue advocacy, they should be upheld as
constitutional.
1. The Government's Interest in Providing Information to the
Electorate
The Court has validated the governmental interest in
giving voters as much information as possible about their
political candidates:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate" in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek
federal office .... The sources of a candidate's financial support also
alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to
be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in
office.
118
112. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 135-67, 172-82 and accompanying text.
115. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68; see also supra text accompanying notes
33-35.
116. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
117. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961)).
118. Id. at 66-67 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)) (footnote
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For example, an environmentalist voter may be interested
in the level of expenditures certain oil companies make on
behalf of a candidate. Or, a pro-life voter would reasonably
want to know if any pro-choice groups fund certain candidates.
Because "[e]lections are our central form of collective political
decision-making,"11 9 it is reasonable to conclude that disclosure
provisions are an effective way of giving the public the
informational tools to make tough decisions. There are
numerous examples of political advertisements on television or
radio that bear the name of a secretive organization as
financier. 120 President George W. Bush also supported the
informational interest when he noted that the disclosure
provisions "will promote the free and swift flow of information
to the public regarding the activities of groups and individuals
in the political process." 121
In the end, it is misleading to the public to allow
mysterious political groups and organizations to criticize or
support a candidate without public knowledge of the
organization's identity. The BCRA's disclosure requirements
require an organization to disclose its funding sources to
empower the public to make informed decisions. 122 These
omitted). Professor Lillian BeVier, on the other hand, states that voters value
information about where the candidate stands on the issues over information
regarding what groups financially support the candidate. Lillian R. BeVier,
Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue Advocacy," and Buckley v. Valeo: A
Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA. L. REV. 285, 303 (2000). Realistically,
it is probably difficult to draw conclusions on what information voters value
most. The strength of the government's informational interest is that it lays
all relevant information about candidates on the table, so each voter may
decide on his or her own terms.
119. Briffault, supra note 42, at 1763 ("Campaign communications are a
crucial part of elections, and, as the Supreme Court has indicated, may be
regulated in order to advance the goals of deliberative, democratic decision-
making.").
120. One example from the 2002 mid-term elections occurred in Minnesota.
There, a Virginia-based organization called Americans for Job Security (AJS)
spent more than $1 million in television and radio ads criticizing Senator Paul
Wellstone, who was facing a tough reelection battle before his death. Eric
Black & Greg Gordon, Group Buying Anti-Wellstone Ads Targets States with
Close Races, STAR TRIB., Oct. 24, 2002, at B1. The organization's lone full-
time employee claimed that AJS was a nonpolitical trade association and did
not intend to influence the election. Id. Wellstone did benefit from another
nefarious association, the Internet-based MoveOnPAC.org, which steered
$644,000 towards the senator. Id.
121. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 4.
122. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 201(a), § 304(f), 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 88-90.
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provisions embody the spirit of the First Amendment that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."123 If sham issue advocacy communications are
unable to adequately disclose their financiers, they will be
replaced by more refined communications. It is true, however,
that a group's First Amendment rights are implicated when
they are barred from anonymously funding an electioneering
communication. The BCRA protects these interests by not
regulating all advertisements, as disclosure is only required for
communications that are targeted to the relevant electorate
and are broadcast within a close proximity before an election. 124
Ultimately, the public will benefit from its increased knowledge
of a campaign's funding sources.
2. The Government's Interest in Preventing the Appearance of
Corruption
The Buckley Court accepted the government's contention
that disclosure provisions are valuable because they serve to
deter corruption:
[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage
those who would use money for improper purposes either before or
after the election. A public armed with information about a
candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-
election special favors that may be given in return. 2 5
If the public has the necessary information to discover
corrupt practices, it can deter corruptive influences of
undisclosed campaign contributions and expenditures. In other
words, "[s]unlight is ... the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman." 126 It is foreseeable that an
organization that expends large amounts of unregulated money
advocating a candidate could benefit after that candidate comes
to power.
For example, in the 2000 Republican presidential primary
campaign, commercials began airing in key television markets
criticizing candidate John McCain's environmental voting
record. 127 The advertisements, although intended to advocate
123. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
124. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
125. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
126. Id. (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Nat'l
Home Library Found. ed., 1933)).
127. Hasen, Surprisingly, supra note 42, at 267-68 (citing Richard Perez-
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the election of then-Texas Governor George W. Bush, never
said so in express terms. 128 The expenditures were bankrolled
to the tune of $2.5 million by Sam Wyly, a key Bush
supporter. 129 When asked about the ads, Wyly said that "of
course" he wanted the commercials to benefit Bush.130 No
evidence has arisen which suggests that Bush has given
political favors to Wyly. That fact, however, is not sufficient
grounds for denying the governmental interest in preventing
the appearance of corruption. 131  In this example, the
government had an interest in deterring actual corruption or
the appearance of corruption. The Wyly-Bush relationship
appeared to be corrupt, and similar situations should be
avoided in the future. The government's interest in an
informed electorate also is implicated, as voters may want to
know what type of an individual would buy such an
advertisement for a candidate.
Mandated disclosure also could snuff out independent
expenditures such as Wyly's. In this situation, outside parties
will either not want their names to be exposed, or they will
disclose their electioneering communications, and public
opinion will decide on the merits of their relationships with
candidates. Again, this argument references the government's
informational interest. If the citizenry has all relevant
information at its disposal, it will be better able to decide
whether a certain candidate has been corrupted by independent
expenditures. 132
Pena, The Ad Campaign: Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2000, at A15).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 267 n.13 (quoting Richard W. Stevenson & Richard Perez-Pena,
Wealthy Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads: Also a Big Bush Donor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al).
131. Another example of the corruption interest occurred in the case of
super-contributor Roger Tamraz. Tamraz made large campaign contributions
to the Republicans in the 1980s, then to the Democrats in the 1990s, and "was
unabashed in admitting his political contributions were made for the purpose
of obtaining access to people in power." 148 CONG. REC. S2115 (daily ed. Mar.
20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin). When asked at a government hearing "to
reflect on his $300,000 contribution to obtain access, Tamraz said, 'I think
next time, I'll give $600,000."' Id.
132. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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3. Government's Interest in Detecting Other Campaign
Violations
Finally, the Buckley Court noted that disclosure
requirements allow the FEC to determine if other campaign
violations have occurred. 133 If electioneering communications
were subject to full disclosure, for example, it would be easy to
tell when a certain individual or group had exceeded the
allowable contribution limits toward a candidate. 134 The three
compelling state interests discussed in this section validate the
BCRA as a crucial benchmark in campaign finance policy,
despite the statute's few minor weaknesses.
B. THE BCRA's DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ARE NARROWLY
TAILORED TO AVOID PROBLEMS OF VAGUENESS AND
OVERBREADTH
The BCRA has avoided the pitfalls of vagueness and
overbreadth in its electioneering provisions. 135 Pursuant to the
BCRA, all communications that refer to a clearly identified
candidate, target the relevant electorate, and are released sixty
days before a general election or thirty days before a primary
election, are express advocacy and must be disclosed. 136 Read
as a whole, these provisions rebut vagueness and overbreadth
concerns. If a court exclusively focused on the first prong,
133. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1976) (per curiam).
134. One example of this interest coming into play occurred in Minnesota's
2002 gubernatorial campaign. Republican candidate Tim Pawlenty was forced
to pay a fine when it was discovered that his campaign and the state
Republican Party impermissibly cooperated on an advertisement. See Dane
Smith, Ethics Panel Fines GOP over Pawlenty Ads, STAR TRIB., Oct. 11, 2002
at Al. The advertisement featured Pawlenty himself in a dialogue with the
camera, although a disclaimer noted that it was paid for by the Republican
party and not sponsored by Pawlenty. See id. Minnesota's Campaign Finance
and Public Disclosure Board held that the party and the campaign illegally
collaborated on the ads. See In re the (Tim) Pawlenty for Governor Comm.,
No. 15475 (Minn. Campaign Fin. & Disclosure Bd. Oct. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/bdinfo/pawlentycon.htm. Thus, the cost of the
ads was charged as a party contribution to Pawlenty's campaign, which was
well in excess of the $20,000 allowed by state law. See Smith, supra.
Essentially, because the Republican party had to disclose itself as the
financier of the ad, the illegal corroboration with Pawlenty was exposed. This
Comment will not expand on the government's interest in detecting other
campaign violations, as it is not central to the sham issue advocacy analysis.
135. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 201(a), § 304(f), 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 88-95.
136. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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however, the provision would be void for vagueness. 137 The
prong that should save the entire provision from successful
vagueness and overbreadth challenges is the third prong: the
time requirement. 138 This prong provides a bright line, so
political parties and other groups will have clear guidance as to
when disclosure is necessary. The bright line also does not
affect true issue advocacy and fulfills the governmental interest
in preventing corruption through unregulated advertisements
during the crucial months before an election.
1. The BCRA's Bright-Line Timing Restrictions Are Not
Vague
The timing of a political communication often determines if
it expressly advocates a candidate or instead advocates an
issue. Political communications aired in close proximity to an
election, for example, "are likely to have their principal impact
on voters' Election Day decisions, rather than on either general
political discourse or particular government actions."139 The
timing of these communications should expose them to the
BCRA regulations because the communications "ought to be
presumed to be part of the election." 40 According to one study,
in the 1998 election season only 35% of advertisements
released before September mentioned a candidate, but after
September 1, 80% of advertisements mentioned a candidate.
141
137. The first prong, that an electioneering communication must "refer to a
clearly identified candidate," standing alone leaves too many unanswered
questions: How does an advertisement refer to a candidate? If we see the
candidate's picture or hear the candidate's voice, is that enough? How is a
candidate clearly identified? If the advertisement refers to a piece of
legislation with the candidate's name on it, is that enough? The importance of
avoiding vagueness is that "[d]ue process requires that a criminal statute
provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his
contemplated conduct is illegal." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77.
138. See BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A)(i)(II), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat.) at 89.
139. Briffault, supra note 42, at 1783.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1784. For critics of the BCRA who assert that its electioneering
communication definition will stifle issue advocacy, it must be understood that
the impact of an advertisement will change depending on when it is released:
A broadcast denunciation of President Clinton's health-care policies
will mean one thing and can have one effect when those policies are
being debated by Congress more than a year before the election, and
will have another meaning and a different effect a few weeks before
Election Day when Congress is in recess and the President and
members of Congress are on the campaign trail.
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Another study noted that "[a]pproximately 86% of group-
sponsored issue ads aired within sixty days of the 2000 general
election were electioneering issue ads rather than genuine
issue ads."142  The BCRA's electioneering communication
definition provides for this pre-election upswing in candidate
ads, as it dictates that advertisements released within sixty
days of a general election must be fully disclosed. 143
Professor Richard Briffault recently asserted that "[t]here
must be a bright-line definition that makes it clear to speakers,
regulators, and courts whether the speech falls within the pre-
election period." 1" The BCRA's sixty and thirty day thresholds
provide this bright-line and thus avoid vagueness concerns. In
short, the BCRA's timing provisions meet the Court's
established vagueness standard because "they are set out in
terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with."145
Furthermore, an electioneering communication will not be
subject to disclosure regulations unless it refers to a clearly
identified candidate and is targeted to the relevant
electorate, 146 and then only if it costs more than $10,000.147
These are all objective criteria that should be easily recognized
by a group producing a communication: "What organization
would be unaware that it is mentioning a candidate, would be
unaware of where the candidate's voters are, or would have
trouble counting back 60 days from an election?" 148 Apart from
avoiding vagueness problems, the BCRA's objective factors also
save the statute from overbreadth concerns.
2. The BCRA's Bright-Line Timing Requirements Are Not
Overbroad
The BCRA presumes that all advertisements are expressly
related to an election if they occur sixty days before a general
Id.
142. Holman & McLoughlin, supra note 97.
143. BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A)(i)(II)(aa), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N (116
Stat.) at 89.
144. Briffault, supra note 42, at 1784.
145. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).
146. BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(a)(3)(A)(i)(I), (III), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat.) at 89; see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
147. See BCRA, sec. 212(a), § 304(g)(2)(A), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at
93.
148. See Potter, supra note 86, at 13.
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election or thirty days before a primary. 149 This provision has
incited great controversy because the BCRA's opponents assert
that it will serve as an outright ban on political speech. 50 This
contention is misleading. The BCRA does not ban such
communications. Instead, anyone wishing to fund the
communications, such as corporations or unions, must pay for
the advertisements out of a political action committee and not
out of a general treasury. 151 The ads also must be disclosed to
the FEC within twenty-four hours.152
Moreover, the BCRA's electioneering definition is not
overbroad because empirical evidence shows that the BCRA
will not restrict legitimate issue advertisements. For example,
a study of the 2000 elections showed that under the Shays-
Meehan sixty-day standard, 153 only three advertisements
(accounting for 0.6% of all ads) would have been considered to
be genuine issue advocacy ads. 154 If the BCRA would have been
in effect in 1998, there would have been only two genuine issue
ads.' 55 What these statistics mean is that the remaining
149. See BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(A), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at
89.
150. See, e.g., Bopp & Coleson, supra note 44, at 8 ("Plainly, this 60-day
gag rule ignores the express advocacy test and encompasses issue advocacy.");
Jowers, supra note 42, at 81 ("The most compelling instance of this overbroad
definition is that it completely prohibits corporations and labor organizations
from engaging in these types of otherwise protected communications."); Office
of the Press Secretary, supra note 4 ("I also have reservations about the
constitutionality of the broad ban on issue advertising, which restrains the
speech of a wide variety of groups on issues of public import in the months
closest to an election.").
151. See Potter, supra note 86, at 10.
152. See BCRA, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(1), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 88.
153. Shays-Meehan was the House version of the McCain-Feingold bill,
which combined to make the BCRA. The Shays-Meehan sixty-day test is, for
purposes of this Comment, identical to the BCRA's electioneering
communication definition.
154. See 148 CONG. REC. S2117-18 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Jeffords).
155. See id. Consider the text of one of the genuine issue ads:
[Announcer] It's almost too much to swallow. Year after year the
federal government takes a bigger piece of the pie. In fact in 1998
we'll pay more in federal taxes than at any time in American history
except for World War II. And now with the [first] budget surplus, in
thirty years all the Washington politicians can talk about is getting
their hands on more of your dough. Call Harry Reid and John Ensign
and tell them no matter who goes to Washington you want them to
cut your taxes. Otherwise they'll be nothing left but the crumbs.
Hasen, Measuring, supra note 42, at 1794. Reid and Ensign were the
candidates in Nevada's U.S. Senate race, and the advertisement did not
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communications are essentially sham issue advocacy. In other
words, the current campaign finance regime treats the ads as
issue-oriented when their clear intent is to support or attack
candidates. The BCRA closes this giant loophole in campaign
finance law but does not stifle issue-oriented speech.
It is also important to recall that the BCRA only imposes
disclosure requirements on communications that cost more
than $10,000.156 This $10,000 rule prevents the Act from being
unconstitutionally overbroad. All campaign spenders who
expend less than $10,000 per year do not need to report their
expenditures, regardless of how political their actions are. 157
This provision ensures that speakers who do not employ large
sums of money will not be deterred from engaging in nominal
political speech. This chilling of low-level, grass-roots speech
was a concern that was addressed both by the BCRA and by the
Court's holding in McIntyre.158 It makes no sense for the
government to impose disclosure regulations on an entity that
spends less than $10,000 on campaign communications, which
is a nominal sum in today's campaigns. 159 In that situation, the
governmental interests-providing information to voters,
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, and
ferreting out other campaign abuses-are not present. 160 This
is because a "cheap" advertisement is not likely to reach a
broad cross-section of people, so it will probably not introduce
any widely disseminated new campaign information.
Therefore, it is improbable that a quid pro quo would be
exchanged for such a small expenditure. Onerous disclosure
requirements imposed on a small, informal operation instead
would likely stifle its speech. 161
Imposing disclosure requirements on larger organizations
expressly advocate either candidate but instead focused on the issue of taxes.
See id.
156. BCRA, sec. 212(a), § 304(g)(2)(A), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 93.
157. See id.
158. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) ("A
written election-related document-particularly a leaflet-is often a
personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint.").
159. The total amount of soft money, not to mention hard money, spent in
the 2002 election cycle was over $250 million. Common Cause, supra note 6.
160. See supra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
161. See Briffault, supra note 42, at 1790 ("Not only is there less public
benefit in regulating small spenders, but there may be a greater burden on
political expression and personal autonomy if the regulation includes
individuals or grass-roots groups whose small expenditures are more likely to
reflect deeply held personal views.").
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and corporations, however, does not unconstitutionally
suppress First Amendment rights, as disclosure requirements
on these organizations are narrowly tailored to support
governmental interests. 162 The BCRA's $10,000 threshold thus
preserves the regulatory framework on large, sophisticated
campaign speakers 163 while providing a cushion for modest
speakers. 164  In short, the $10,000 threshold requirement
satisfies the dictates of the First Amendment while allowing for
the governmental interests in informative, non-corrupt
campaigns. Finally, a communication must reach 50,000
people to be regulated under the BCRA. 65 This threshold
requirement further ensures that the BCRA is not overbroad
because communications aired through mediums that typically
do not reach 50,000 people, such as low-power radio or
television, will not have to comply with potentially onerous
regulations.
C. MINOR WEAKNESSES IN THE BCRA
The BCRA has a few weaknesses inherent in its structure,
but none of these deficiencies is enough to invalidate the Act.
One weakness is present in the provision that mandates
disclosure for all communications that cost more than$10,000.166 The $10,000 baseline is not indexed to inflation. 167
In the future, many smaller political organizations could find
themselves having to disclose their activities, even though they
are putting out the same amount of limited political
162. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666
(1990) (holding that in regards to regulations on corporate political spending,
"the State's decision to regulate only corporations is precisely tailored to serve
the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the
corrosive effect of political 'war chests'").
163. These large political spenders probably would not be deterred from a
system of disclosure for heretofore known issue advocacy. As one scholar
noted, "I have strong doubts that the AFL-CIO would have been deterred from
running its $35 million in issue ads in the 1996 presidential election if the law
required disclosure of its contributors or expenditures." Hasen, Surprisingly,
supra note 42, at 280-81.
164. Speaking of disclosure effects on small, political organizations, the
Supreme Court has said that "the administrative costs of complying with such
increased responsibilities may create a disincentive for the organization itself
to speak." Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
254 n.7 (1986).
165. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 201(a), § 304(f)(3)(C), 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 90.
166. Id. sec. 212(a), § 304(g)(2)(A).
167. See id.
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communications. A simple amendment indexing this provision
to inflation would solve the problem. 168
Also, some associations could be fearful of disclosing their
expenditures because of retaliatory measures by groups that
oppose their viewpoints. 169  The BCRA makes no such
exemption for these types of controversial associations, so they
may be chilled from engaging in any electioneering
communications. 170  Any number of associations, such as
groups advocating communist or racist views, could be
reluctant to disclose their identities and donors out of fear of
retaliation by groups that oppose their beliefs. 171 If these fears
are justified, these associations would essentially forfeit their
right to speak. Because of this narrowly circumscribed
instance, it would be wise to amend the BCRA to protect
vulnerable associations. Such an amendment must be carefully
monitored, however, because an exemption could be subject to
widespread abuse by organizations that seek to avoid
disclosure requirements by dubiously claiming they are
otherwise fearful to speak. While the BCRA is not perfect, it is
a crucial first step towards limiting the quantity of
electioneering communications funded by anonymous groups.
Concerns with the BCRA should be addressed through
congressional amendment, not judicial fiat.
D. THE BCRA's REGULATIONS Do NOT RUN AFOUL OF SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
A new definition of express advocacy must be unambiguous
and narrowly drawn, but it also must avoid obstacles presented
by previous Supreme Court holdings. The Court's decision in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc. (MCFL), which held that a small nonprofit, political
corporation did not have to comply with federal disclosure
168. To analogize, such a problem hampered the FECA's campaign
contribution limitations, which restricted individual donations to $1,000 per
candidate, per election. At the time the BCRA was being formulated, the
$1,000 contribution limit was worth almost $3,000 after inflation. See DREW,
supra note 7, at 14.
169. The Supreme Court addressed this issue during the civil rights
movement when it ruled that the Alabama chapter of the NAACP did not have
to disclose the names of its members under state law, since the law would
have effectively silenced the NAACP membership out of fear. See NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
170. See id.
171. See id.
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requirements, can be distinguished from the BCRA. 172 The
corporation in MCFL was exempted from disclosure
requirements precisely because it was a small, politically-
oriented company, and onerous regulations would have stifled
its motivation to enter the political arena. 173  Instead of
contradicting MCFL, the BCRA has expressly followed the
decision by exempting organizations identified in Internal
Revenue Code sections 501(c)(4) and 527(e)(1) from its
disclosure requirements. 174 The Court held in Austin that
larger, business-oriented organizations may be regulated via
disclosure requirements, 175 so any exception created in MCFL
is limited to small, political organizations. This issue is
addressed by the BCRA. 176 Finally, while McIntyre invalidated
disclosure requirements on a lone pamphleteer, the case turned
on the fact that the election at issue was a school tax levy, and
not a candidate election.' 77  The government's interest in
preventing corruption was thus inadequate because there were
no candidates to corrupt, and a school tax levy itself cannot be
corrupted. 178
Opponents of campaign finance reform who rely on
McIntyre as proof that all campaign disclosure requirements
are presumptively unconstitutional are incorrect. 179 The Court
repeatedly has stated that disclosure of corporate and other
organizational communications in candidate elections is a
compelling governmental interest that is not overruled by
McIntyre's invalidation of disclosure requirements with respect
172. See 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986); see also supra notes 46-60 and
accompanying text.
173. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254.
174. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 203(b), § 316(c)(2), 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 91. The FEC has extended this exemption to
501(c)(3) corporations. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg.
65,189, 65,199 (Oct. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
175. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990) (noting that a corporation receives special state-sponsored advantages
which make it amenable to campaign regulation); see also supra notes 63-72
and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 20.
177. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-56 (1995);
see also supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
178. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 352; Hasen, Surprisingly, supra note 42, at
274 (distinguishing McIntyre from Buckley).
179. See BeVier, supra note 118, at 288 ("McIntyre reaffirms the Court's
commitment to strict scrutiny of disclosure requirements in order to preserve
the right to engage in political advocacy unencumbered by burdensome
regulations that produce few benefits.").
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to a lone pamphleteer.180 Despite the likelihood that the BCRA
is constitutional, given the issues at stake, it is not surprising
that the BCRA's opponents have undertaken the task of
invalidating the Act in court. This Comment's final section will
apply the arguments discussed in previous sections to
McConnell v. FEC.
IV. MCCONNELL v. FEC: MCCONNELL'S CHALLENGE
SHOULD FAIL
More than eighty plaintiffs have challenged the BCRA's
campaign disclosure requirements as impermissible
infringements on the First Amendment. 181  Almost every
provision of the Act was questioned in more than eleven
different actions, which were subsequently consolidated into
McConnell v. FEC.182 Because the BCRA is so controversial,
the Act provides for an expedited judicial process, 18 3 so the
Supreme Court could hear the case as early as spring of
2003.184 The McConnell plaintiffs first allege that regulation of
speech that "does not expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate" is an unconstitutional
abridgement of the First Amendment.18 5  This argument
essentially opposes the imposition of express advocacy
disclosure requirements onto sham issue advocacy
advertisements. 186 The BCRA, on the other hand, responsibly
holds that all ads in reference to a clearly identified candidate
will be considered to be express advocacy if they occur within
sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a
primary election. 187 Speech must be disclosed in this instance,
but it is not unduly restricted.'1 88
180. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 354 n.18.
181. See The Campaign & Media Legal Ctr., supra note 9.
182. See id.
183. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing that a challenge
to the BCRA is first heard by a three-judge district court in the District of
Columbia, with appeals to be directly certified to the U.S. Supreme Court).
184. See The Campaign & Media Legal Ctr., supra note 9.
185. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief 148, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 02-0582
(D.D.C. May 7, 2002), http://lawschool.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance
/mcconnell-v-feccomplaint507O2.pdf (last viewed Mar. 31, 2003).
186. See id.
187. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (definition of
electioneering communications).
188. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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The plaintiffs also complain that the BCRA prohibits or
limits speech made by smaller political associations, such as
the nonprofit corporation at issue in MCFL.189 This argument
ignores the fact that the BCRA has exempted from its
electioneering regulations organizations identified in Internal
Revenue Code sections 501(c)(4) and 527(e)(1),190 along with the
fact that regulations on general corporate campaign speech
have already been affirmed in Austin.1 91 Finally, the plaintiffs
contend that the BCRA's disclosure regulations are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 192 Again, the BCRA
subjects no pure issue advocacy advertisements to its disclosure
regulations.1 93 The Act will only regulate communications that
refer to a clearly identified candidate, meet the $10,000
monetary threshold, and target the relevant electorate within a
specified period close to an election. 194 Therefore, the district
court should find that the BCRA is a reasonable solution to the
complexities of campaign finance disclosure and not an
unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The current definition of express advocacy is unworkable.
Buckley's magic words test is a paper tiger, as nefarious
political groups, corporations, and other organizations have
avoided reasonable disclosure requirements simply by not
using the magic words in their advertisements. The First
Amendment provides ample protection for these groups to
speak, but it does not grant absolute immunity from regulation.
The BCRA upholds the First Amendment through its disclosure
requirements for electioneering communications: The
189. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief 949, McConnell, http://lawschool.stanford.edu/library/
campaignfinance/mcconnell-v-feccomplaint50702.pdf (last viewed Mar. 31,
2003).
190. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 203(b), § 316(c)(2), 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81, 91; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
191. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669
(1990).
192. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief 50, McConnell, http://lawschool.stanford.edu/library/
campaignfinance/mcconnell-v-feccomplaint50702.pdf (last viewed Mar. 31,
2003).
193. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 135-67 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness
and overbreadth concerns).
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regulations are clear, they are limited to election-related
speech, and they adequately relate to governmental interests to
provide informative, corruption-free campaigns. In short, a
court evaluating this portion of the BCRA should hold that it
withstands "exacting scrutiny" because it is narrowly tailored
to meet compelling governmental interests.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:16631694
